Configure permissions of GITHUB_TOKEN
in workflows
#129
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GITHUB_TOKEN
is an access token that is automatically generated and made accessible for use in GitHub Actions workflow runs. The global default permissions of this token for workflow runs in a trusted context (i.e., not triggered by apull_request
event from a fork) are set in the GitHub enterprise/organization/repository's administrative settings, giving it either read-only or write permissions in all scopes.In the case of a read-only default configuration, any workflow operations that require write permissions would fail with an error like:
In the case of a write default configuration, workflows have unnecessary permissions, which violates the security principle of least privilege.
For this reason, GitHub Actions now allows fine grained control at a per-workflow or per-workflow job scope of the permissions provided to the token. This is done using the
permissions
workflow key, which is used here to configure the workflows for only the permissions require by each individual job.Configuration Granularity
I chose to always configure permissions at the job level even though in some cases the same permissions configuration could be used for all jobs in a workflow. Even if functionally equivalent, I think it is semantically more appropriate to always set the permissions at the job scope since the intention is to make the most granular possible permissions configuration. Hopefully this approach will increase the likelihood that appropriate permissions configurations will be made in any additional jobs that are added to the workflows in the future.
Security Implications
The automatic permissions downgrade from write to read for workflow runs in an untrusted context (e.g., triggered by a
pull_request
event from a fork) is unaffected by this change.API Request Implications
Even when all permissions are withheld (
permissions: {}
), the token still provides the authenticated API request rate limiting allowance (authenticating API requests to avoid rate limiting is a one of the uses of the token in these workflows).Excess Permissions
Read permissions are required in the "contents" scope in order to checkout private repositories. Even though those permissions are not required when the workflows are installed in this public repositories, these workflows are "templates", intended to be applicable in public and private repositories both. So a small excess in permissions was chosen instead of the alternative of having to maintain separate variants of each workflow for use in public or private repos.
For the sake of maintainability, it is best to avoid any unnecessary differences between the files in this repository and the contents of the upstream "templates".