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feat(security): explicitly whitelist URL schemes for bootstrap. #15427
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@Rob--W thanks for the suggestion by the way, whitelisting is indeed much better. This change is motivated by the discussion in mozilla/addons-linter#1000. |
petebacondarwin
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Nov 23, 2016
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Lgtm
dcherman
reviewed
Nov 23, 2016
case 'data:': | ||
return true; | ||
default: | ||
false; |
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Did you mean return false
?
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:-(
I've gotten used to TypeScript too much. Fixed.
Many browsers have some extension URL scheme. It is unclear how many of those have the security issue of allowing parser-inserted loads of extension URLs. To be conservative, this code whitelists the URL schemes that are known to be subject to CSP, i.e. the ones that are expected and safe.
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petebacondarwin
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Many browsers have some extension URL scheme. It is unclear how many of those have the security issue of allowing parser-inserted loads of extension URLs. To be conservative, this code whitelists the URL schemes that are known to be subject to CSP, i.e. the ones that are expected and safe.
ellimist
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to ellimist/angular.js
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Mar 15, 2017
…lar#15427) Many browsers have some extension URL scheme. It is unclear how many of those have the security issue of allowing parser-inserted loads of extension URLs. To be conservative, this code whitelists the URL schemes that are known to be subject to CSP, i.e. the ones that are expected and safe.
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Many browsers have some extension URL scheme. It is unclear how many of
those have the security issue of allowing parser-inserted loads of
extension URLs.
To be conservative, this code whitelists the URL schemes that are known
to be subject to CSP, i.e. the ones that are expected and safe.
Note: there is no change in tests as behavior does not change for any known URL.