Update dependency requests to v2.31.0 [SECURITY] (#1310)

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This PR contains the following updates:

| Package | Change | Age | Adoption | Passing | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [requests](https://togithub.com/psf/requests)
([changelog](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/master/HISTORY.md))
| `==2.29.0` -> `==2.31.0` |
[![age](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/age-slim)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![adoption](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/adoption-slim)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![passing](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/compatibility-slim/2.29.0)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![confidence](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/confidence-slim/2.29.0)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
| [requests](https://togithub.com/psf/requests)
([changelog](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/master/HISTORY.md))
| `==2.30.0` -> `==2.31.0` |
[![age](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/age-slim)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![adoption](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/adoption-slim)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![passing](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/compatibility-slim/2.30.0)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![confidence](https://badges.renovateapi.com/packages/pypi/requests/2.31.0/confidence-slim/2.30.0)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|

### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

####
[CVE-2023-32681](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q)

### Impact

Since Requests v2.3.0, Requests has been vulnerable to potentially
leaking `Proxy-Authorization` headers to destination servers,
specifically during redirects to an HTTPS origin. This is a product of
how `rebuild_proxies` is used to recompute and [reattach the
`Proxy-Authorization`
header](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/f2629e9e3c7ce3c3c8c025bcd8db551101cbc773/requests/sessions.py#L319-L328)
to requests when redirected. Note this behavior has _only_ been observed
to affect proxied requests when credentials are supplied in the URL user
information component (e.g. `https://username:password@proxy:8080`).

**Current vulnerable behavior(s):**

1. HTTP → HTTPS: **leak**
2. HTTPS → HTTP: **no leak**
3. HTTPS → HTTPS: **leak**
4. HTTP → HTTP: **no leak**

For HTTP connections sent through the proxy, the proxy will identify the
header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the
destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the
`Proxy-Authorization` header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the
proxy has no visibility into further tunneled requests. This results in
Requests forwarding the header to the destination server
unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate
those credentials.

The reason this currently works for HTTPS connections in Requests is the
`Proxy-Authorization` header is also handled by urllib3 with our usage
of the ProxyManager in adapters.py with
[`proxy_manager_for`](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/f2629e9e3c7ce3c3c8c025bcd8db551101cbc773/requests/adapters.py#L199-L235).
This will compute the required proxy headers in `proxy_headers` and pass
them to the Proxy Manager, avoiding attaching them directly to the
Request object. This will be our preferred option going forward for
default usage.

### Patches
Starting in Requests v2.31.0, Requests will no longer attach this header
to redirects with an HTTPS destination. This should have no negative
impacts on the default behavior of the library as the proxy credentials
are already properly being handled by urllib3's ProxyManager.

For users with custom adapters, this _may_ be potentially breaking if
you were already working around this behavior. The previous
functionality of `rebuild_proxies` doesn't make sense in any case, so we
would encourage any users impacted to migrate any handling of
Proxy-Authorization directly into their custom adapter.

### Workarounds
For users who are not able to update Requests immediately, there is one
potential workaround.

You may disable redirects by setting `allow_redirects` to `False` on all
calls through Requests top-level APIs. Note that if you're currently
relying on redirect behaviors, you will need to capture the 3xx response
codes and ensure a new request is made to the redirect destination.
```
import requests
r = requests.get('http://github.com/', allow_redirects=False)
```

### Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and disclosed by the following
individuals.

Dennis Brinkrolf, Haxolot (https://haxolot.com/)
Tobias Funke, (tobiasfunke93@​gmail.com)

---

### Release Notes

<details>
<summary>psf/requests</summary>

###
[`v2.31.0`](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/HEAD/HISTORY.md#&#8203;2310-2023-05-22)

[Compare
Source](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/compare/v2.30.0...v2.31.0)

**Security**

- Versions of Requests between v2.3.0 and v2.30.0 are vulnerable to
potential
forwarding of `Proxy-Authorization` headers to destination servers when
    following HTTPS redirects.

When proxies are defined with user info (https://user:pass@proxy:8080),
Requests
will construct a `Proxy-Authorization` header that is attached to the
request to
    authenticate with the proxy.

In cases where Requests receives a redirect response, it previously
reattached
the `Proxy-Authorization` header incorrectly, resulting in the value
being
sent through the tunneled connection to the destination server. Users
who rely on
defining their proxy credentials in the URL are *strongly* encouraged to
upgrade
to Requests 2.31.0+ to prevent unintentional leakage and rotate their
proxy
    credentials once the change has been fully deployed.

Users who do not use a proxy or do not supply their proxy credentials
through
the user information portion of their proxy URL are not subject to this
    vulnerability.

Full details can be read in our [Github Security
Advisory](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q)
and [CVE-2023-32681](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32681).

###
[`v2.30.0`](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/blob/HEAD/HISTORY.md#&#8203;2300-2023-05-03)

[Compare
Source](https://togithub.com/psf/requests/compare/v2.29.0...v2.30.0)

**Dependencies**

-   ⚠️ Added support for urllib3 2.0. ⚠️

This may contain minor breaking changes so we advise careful testing and
reviewing
https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/latest/v2-migration-guide.html
    prior to upgrading.

    Users who wish to stay on urllib3 1.x can pin to `urllib3<2`.

</details>

---

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---

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Author: renovate-bot

gcp/api/Pipfile

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ grpcio = "==1.54.2"
 osv = {editable = true, path = "../../"}
 packageurl-python = "==0.11.1"
 packaging = "==20.9"
-requests = "==2.30.0"
+requests = "==2.31.0"
 grpcio-reflection = "*"
 
 [dev-packages]

gcp/api/Pipfile.lock

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ markupsafe = "==2.1.2"
 osv = {editable = true, path = "../../"}
 packaging = "==21.3"
 redis = "==4.5.4"
-requests = "==2.29.0"
+requests = "==2.31.0"
 grpcio-status = "==1.54.0"
 
 [dev-packages]