You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: lectures/ge_arrow.md
+37-18Lines changed: 37 additions & 18 deletions
Original file line number
Diff line number
Diff line change
@@ -12,27 +12,25 @@ kernelspec:
12
12
name: python3
13
13
---
14
14
15
-
# Competitive equilibrium with one-period Arrow securities
15
+
# Competitive equilibria with Arrow securities
16
16
17
17
+++
18
18
19
-
## Bellmanizing and Computing
19
+
## Introduction
20
20
21
-
This lecture implements a Python version of the model presented in section 9.3.3 of RMT5 chapter 9.
22
-
23
-
This lecture is a laboratory for experimenting with instances of a competitive equilibrium of a pure exchange economy with
21
+
This lecture is a laboratory for experimenting with instances of competitive equilibria of an infinite-horizon pure exchange economy with
24
22
25
23
* Markov endowments
26
24
27
-
* Complete markets in oneperiod Arrow state-contingent securities
25
+
* Complete markets in one-period Arrow state-contingent securities
28
26
29
27
* Discounted expected utility preferences of a kind often specified in macro and finance
30
28
31
29
* Common expected utility preferences across agents
32
30
33
31
* Common beliefs across agents
34
32
35
-
* A CRRA one-period utility function that implies the existence of a representative consumer whose consumption process can be plugged into a formula for the pricing kernel for one-step Arrow securities and thereby determine equilbrium prices before determing an equilibrium distribution of wealth
33
+
* A constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) one-period utility function that implies the existence of a representative consumer whose consumption process can be plugged into a formula for the pricing kernel for one-step Arrow securities and thereby determine equilbrium prices before determing an equilibrium distribution of wealth
36
34
37
35
* Diverse endowments across agents that provide motivations for reallocating goods across time and Markov states
38
36
@@ -44,13 +42,28 @@ We use Bellman equations to describe
44
42
45
43
* continuation wealths
46
44
47
-
* state-by-state natural debt limits
45
+
* state-by-state natural debt limits
46
+
47
+
48
+
In the course of presenting the model we shall describe these important ideas
49
+
50
+
* the widespread use a **resolvent operator** in this class of models
51
+
52
+
* the necessity of state-by-state **borrowing limits** in infinite horizon economies
53
+
54
+
* the absence of any required **borrowing limits** in finite horizon economies
55
+
56
+
* a counterpart of the law of iterated expectations known as a **law of iterated values**
57
+
58
+
* a notion of **state-variable degeneracy** that prevails within a competitive equilibrium and that explains repeated appearances of resolvent operators
48
59
49
60
50
61
+++
51
62
52
63
## The setting
53
64
65
+
In effect, this lecture implements a Python version of the model presented in section 9.3.3 of Ljungqvist and Sargent {cite}`Ljungqvist2012`.
66
+
54
67
### Preferences and endowments
55
68
56
69
In each period $t\geq 0$, there is a realization of a stochastic
@@ -130,14 +143,18 @@ that consumers share probabilities $\pi_t(s^t)$ for all $t$ and $s^t$.
130
143
131
144
132
145
A **feasible allocation** satisfies
133
-
$$\sum_i c_t^i(s^t) \leq \sum_i y_t^i(s^t) $$
146
+
147
+
$$
148
+
\sum_i c_t^i(s^t) \leq \sum_i y_t^i(s^t)
149
+
$$
150
+
134
151
for all $t$ and for all $s^t$.
135
152
136
153
+++
137
154
138
155
### Recursive formulation
139
156
140
-
Following descriptions in section 9.3.3 of RMT5 chapter 9, we set up a competitive equilibrium of a pure exchange economy with complete markets in one-period Arrow securities.
157
+
Following descriptions in section 9.3.3 of Ljungqvist and Sargent {cite}`Ljungqvist2012` chapter 9, we set up a competitive equilibrium of a pure exchange economy with complete markets in one-period Arrow securities.
141
158
142
159
When endowments $y^i(s)$ are all functions of a common Markov state $s$,
143
160
the pricing kernel takes the form $Q(s'|s)$.
@@ -237,7 +254,7 @@ the single budget constraint in arrangement with all trades occurring at tim
237
254
238
255
239
256
240
-
Starting the system off with $a_0^i =0 \ \forall i$ has a striking implication that we can call **state variable degeneracy**.
257
+
Starting the system off with $a_0^i =0$ forall $i$ has a striking implication that we can call **state variable degeneracy**.
241
258
242
259
243
260
Thus, although there are two state variables in the value function $v^i(a,s)$, within a recursive competitive equilibrium
@@ -251,9 +268,9 @@ starting from $a_0^i = 0 \ \forall i$ at the starting Markov state $s_0$, two
251
268
The first finding asserts that each household recurrently visits the zero financial wealth state with which he began life.
252
269
253
270
254
-
The second finding asserts that the exogenous Markov state is all we require to track an individual.
271
+
The second finding asserts that the exogenous Markov state is all we require to track an individual within a competitive equilibrium.
255
272
256
-
Financial wealth turns out to be redundant.
273
+
Financial wealth turns out to be redundant because it is an exact function of the Markov state for each individual.
257
274
258
275
259
276
This outcome depends critically on there being complete markets in Arrow securities.
@@ -519,7 +536,7 @@ Note that $Q_{ij}$ is independent of vector $\alpha$.
519
536
520
537
Thus, we have the
521
538
522
-
**Key finding:** We can compute competitive equilibrium prices prior to computing a distribution of wealth.
539
+
**Key finding:** We can compute competitive equilibrium **prices** prior to computing a **distribution of wealth**.
523
540
524
541
+++
525
542
@@ -630,7 +647,7 @@ y\left(\bar{s}_{n}\right)
630
647
\end{array}\right]
631
648
$$
632
649
633
-
Note that $\sum_{k=1}^K \psi^k = \boldsymbol{0}_{n \times 1}$.
650
+
Note that $\sum_{k=1}^K \psi^k = {0}_{n \times 1}$.
634
651
635
652
**Remark:** At the initial state $s_0 \in \begin{bmatrix} \bar s_1, \ldots, \bar s_n \end{bmatrix}$
636
653
the continuation wealth $\psi^k(s_0) = 0$ for all agents $k = 1, \ldots, K$. This indicates that
0 commit comments